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TAGS: [KACT](#) [PARM](#) [BIC](#) [JCIC](#) [US](#) [RS](#)

SUBJECT: BIC-IX: BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION COMMISSION,
SESSION IX, JULY 16, 2008

REF: GENEVA 2579 (BIC-VIII-001)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Bilateral Implementation Commission.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

11. (U) This is BIC-IX-001.

12. (U) Meeting Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 3:30 - 5:20 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

13. (C) U.S. and Russian representatives to the Moscow Treaty's Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC) met at the U.S. Mission in Geneva, Switzerland, on July 16, 2008, to conduct the ninth session of the BIC. The sides presented briefings on the status of, and plans for, reductions in their strategic nuclear forces. The U.S. briefing specified that the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW), as of May 31, 2008, was 2647. The Russian briefing specified that the number of Russian strategic nuclear warheads (SNW), as of May 1, 2008, was 2032. Koshelev also confirmed that the Russian briefing and numbers provided were in fact confidential. Questions were limited, and there were no significant changes in plans to meet the Moscow Treaty limits reported by either side since the eighth session of the BIC (Reftel). Of note, however, were Koshelev's opening remarks, which included his characterization of selective points from a speech Russian President Medvedev gave on July 15, 2008 at the Russian Foreign Ministry. Some of the points Koshelev expressed concerned the relationship between strategic offensive forces and strategic defensive forces, and stated that deployment of missile defenses in Europe will affect Russia's strategic nuclear forces and existing arrangements for strategic stability, including the Moscow Treaty.

OPENING REMARKS

14. (C) Taylor and Koshelev exchanged welcomes and introduced their delegations. Koshelev then commented on remarks made by President Medvedev on July 15, 2008 concerning Russia's foreign policy objectives, noting that elements were relevant to the work of the BIC and the implementation of the Moscow Treaty. Specifically, he noted that:

- Russia will maintain its long-standing positions concerning matters of disarmament and arms control.

- Cold War institutions for maintaining stability are no longer efficient, and new arrangements are necessary. In this regard, Russia has proposed a new Treaty on European Security to replace existing treaties.

- 2009 marks the 70th anniversary of the beginning of World War II, and it is unacceptable to repeat the events leading up to the war as some European capitals are trying. Russia will do its part to resist this type of behavior in order to preserve the borders and security of Europe established as a result of the War.

- Regarding strategic stability between the United States and Russia, the deployment in Europe of U.S. missile defense assets will affect Russia's strategic forces and, in turn, will impact current arrangements concerning strategic stability, including implementation of the Moscow Treaty. Deployment of missile defenses will destroy elements of security upon which strategic stability is based. There is a close relationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defenses; changes in defensive capability will affect offensive arms.

(Begin comment: President Medvedev spoke on July 15, 2008, at a meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations at the Russian Foreign Ministry. End comment.)

15. (C) Koshelev concluded his opening comments by stating that the need for a reliable exchange of information in the context of the Moscow Treaty is increasing as controls concerning data exchanges (i.e., under START) will soon expire. To help monitor implementation of the Treaty, Russia proposes the sides agree on a common definition for the term "strategic nuclear warhead." Discussions in the BIC have brought the sides closer in their understanding of the term, and Russia proposes to complete this work by reaching an agreement.

16. (C) Taylor expressed appreciation for Koshelev's summary of Medvedev's remarks stating that he would report this to Washington. With regard to the BIC and a common definition for the term "strategic nuclear warhead," Taylor noted that this had been discussed before in the BIC and that this discussion had brought the sides very close in terms of their understanding of each other. Therefore, the U.S. position remained that it was not necessary to codify a definition for the term; the United States had defined the term the same since signature of the Treaty.

17. (C) Koshelev agreed that discussions in the BIC had brought the sides closer. He commented that the importance of the term extended beyond the Moscow Treaty and was relevant in the context of a post-START arrangement, which remained a top priority between the United States and Russia. The dialogue on strategic issues would be continued with the next U.S. administration and a definition for the term would need to be revisited.

18. (C) Ryzhkov presented the following briefing, classified confidential, updating the status of and plans for Russia's strategic nuclear forces. At the beginning of the briefing he noted that Russia was open to discussion concerning the format of the briefings exchanged in the BIC.

Begin text:

Official Translation

Title Page: Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions

Ninth Session of the Bilateral Implementation Commission for

the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions

Geneva, July 2008

Page 2

Plans to Reduce and Limit Strategic Nuclear Warheads

The Russian Federation's plans have not changed since the previous session of the Bilateral Implementation Commission for the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions:

-- The Russian Federation will reduce and limit its strategic nuclear warheads so that by December 31, 2012, the aggregate number of such warheads will not exceed 1700-2200;

-- For the purposes of counting nuclear warheads under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, the Russian Federation considers the following:

- reentry vehicles on ICBMs in their launchers;
- reentry vehicles on SLBMs in their launchers on board submarines;
- nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers and those stored in weapons storage areas directly at heavy bomber bases.

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The Russian Federation is implementing its plans by:

-- removing from service and subsequently eliminating missiles, launchers, submarines, and heavy bombers that have reached the end of their warranted service life;

-- converting silo launchers of ICBMs for new armaments and modernizing heavy bombers;

-- developing and putting into service land-based and sea-based strategic missile systems of a new type:

- tests of the new RSM-56 SLBM will continue;
- tests of the prototype of the RS-24 ICBM, which is intended to replace obsolete missiles on alert status, will continue;
- work on equipping the Strategic Rocket Forces with missile systems with silo-based and mobile-based SS-27 ICBMs will continue.

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Plans for Strategic Offensive Arms Reductions in 2008

In 2008 the Russian Federation plans to eliminate:

-- 23 road-mobile launchers for SS-25 ICBMs;
-- 20 launchers of SS-19 ICBMs;
-- 20 launchers of SS-N-20 SLBMs;
-- 31 SS-25 ICBMs;
-- 17 SS-19 ICBMs;
-- 3 SS-24 ICBMs;
-- 10 SS-N-18 SLBMs;
-- 10 SS-N-20 SLBMs;

-- 10 SS-N-23s (sic);

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Progress in Strategic Offensive Arms Reductions in 2008

By May 1, 2008, the Russian Federation had eliminated:

-- 7 road-mobile launchers for SS-25 ICBMs;
-- 18 SS-25 ICBMs;
-- 2 SS-19 ICBMs;
-- 1 SS-18 ICBM;
-- 3 SS-24 ICBMs;
-- 2 SS-N-20 SLBMs.

(Begin comment: Ryzhkov emphasized that plans may change based on evolving strategic requirements but that, as of May 1, 2008, Russia was continuing to implement the annual plan it had prepared for the year. Ryzhkov also noted the following:

- One road-mobile SS-25 launcher was converted to be a fixed launcher.

- All SS-24 ICBMs are now eliminated.

- Since May 1, 2008, Russia eliminated an additional six road-mobile launchers for SS-25 ICBMs, ten SS-25 ICBMs, and three SS-19 ICBMs, one of which was eliminated by launching.

End comment.)

Page 6

Results of Implementation of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions in 2008

-- As of May 1, 2008, the Russian Federation had 2032 strategic nuclear warheads under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which is within the framework of the quantitative limitations provided for by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions.

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Conclusion

-- The Russian Federation continues to reduce its strategic nuclear warheads under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions.

-- The Russian Federation determines for itself the composition and structure of its strategic nuclear forces. In this connection, the Russian Federation is guided by national security interests and the interests of maintaining strategic stability.

End text.

U.S. BRIEFING ON
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

19. (U) Yaguchi presented the following unclassified briefing updating the status of U.S. ODSNW. (Begin comment: What follows are the briefing slides and the narrative used for

each slide. Only the briefing slides without notes were provided to the Russians. End comment.)

Begin text.

Title Slide
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces
Bilateral Implementation Commission

July 2008

Narrative:

- This briefing will provide you an update on our plans for strategic nuclear forces.

- This briefing will summarize actions we have taken and long-range plans for these forces.

Slide 2

U.S. Plans for Strategic Nuclear Forces

- Reduce total operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 by 31 December 2012:
 - Remove some delivery systems from service; and
 - For delivery systems retained, remove some warheads from operational missiles to reduce the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads
- Completed actions:
 - Removed 4 Trident SSBNs from strategic service
 - B-1B conventional role only
 - Deactivated Peacekeeper ICBMs
 - Deactivated Trident I SLBMs
 - Converted 4 Trident I SSBNs to carry Trident II SLBMs
- Ongoing actions:
 - Removing some warheads from operational missiles
 - Removing 50 Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers from strategic service
 - Deactivating all AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles
- Baseline 2012 Strategic Nuclear Force Structure:
 - 14 Trident II SSBNs
 - 450 Minuteman III ICBMs
 - 20 B-2 Bombers
 - 76 B-52H Bombers

--- However, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report plans to reduce the B-52 force to 56 aircraft.

Narrative:

- Our existing strategic nuclear force structure, with the reductions mentioned during previous briefings, will remain in service at least through 2020.

- Minuteman service life is projected through 2030.
 - Ohio class ballistic missile submarines have been extended in life and the oldest of the remaining 14 is planned to be operational beyond 2025.

- Our oldest bomber, the B-52, has had numerous upgrades and, along with the B-2, should remain operational for several decades.

- We have underway, or in the planning stages, life extension programs to ensure that these systems remain reliable and safe and incorporate modern electronics.

- In addition, we are beginning to examine options to replace these weapon systems when each reaches the end of its service life.

Slide 3

Update on ICBMs

ICBMs - Minuteman III

- Status: 43 of 50 Minuteman III silo launchers removed from strategic service.

Narrative:

- We started deactivating 50 Minuteman III silo launchers.
 - The first silo was deactivated in early summer 2007.
 - As of May 31, 2008, we deactivated 43 silos.

Slide 4

Update on SSBNs

Modification of 4 SSBNs to SSGNs

- Status: Four Trident I SSBNs have been removed from strategic service and have completed their refueling overhauls.

- All four SSGNs have completed modification.
 - There are no plans to return Trident I SSBNs to strategic service

Conversion of 4 Trident I SSBNs to Trident II

- Status: Four submarines have been converted from Trident I to Trident II SLBM launchers

- Trident I SLBMs are deactivated.

Narrative:

- Our plan to remove 4 Trident I ballistic missile submarines from strategic service and to modify them for other roles is complete.
- Our plan to convert four Trident I submarines to carry the Trident II SLBM is complete.
- There will no longer be any operational Trident I launchers.

Slide 5

Update on Heavy Bombers

Heavy Bombers

- Status: One less B-2

Nuclear Air-Launched Cruise Missiles

- Status: Deactivating all AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles

Narrative:

Heavy Bombers

- Total number of B-2 bombers is reduced by one due to an aircraft loss.

Nuclear Air Launched Cruise Missiles

- The complete deactivation of the Advanced Cruise Missile force will take several years.

Slide 6

Total U.S. Operationally Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads

- For purposes of the Moscow Treaty, the United States considers Operationally Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads to be:

-- Reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles in their launchers

-- Reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic missiles in their launchers onboard submarines, and

-- Nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases

- A small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads, to include spare ICBM warheads, are located at heavy bomber bases.

-- The U.S. does not consider these warheads to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

- As of May 31, 2008, the aggregate number of U.S. Operationally Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads was 2647.

Narrative:

- As we stated previously, this is the U.S. definition of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

- The U.S. does not consider spare warheads to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

- During BIC VIII, the U.S. reported that, as of September 30, 2007, the aggregate number of U.S. ODSNW was 3079.

- As of May 31, 2008, the aggregate number of U.S. ODSNW was 2647.

Slide 7

Summary

- Current and planned strategic nuclear force structure and activities are consistent with the current strategic environment.

Narrative:

In summary,

- Our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads continue to be reduced consistent with the terms of the Moscow Treaty.

- The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommended reducing the MM-III ICBMs to 450 and the B-52 fleet to 56.

- However, Congress expressed its view that only 18 of 94 B-52 bombers could be retired, so the B-52 fleet may number 76.

- We are deactivating all AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles.

- We have a number of activities in progress related to sustainment of our strategic forces and implementation of our defense strategy.

- These activities, and our strategic nuclear forces, are consistent with the new strategic environment.

- Our intention is to continue to provide transparency and predictability on our activities and forces through actions such as this briefing.

End text.

QUESTIONS RAISED

¶10. (C) Koshelev sought clarification concerning the classification of the U.S. presentation, asking whether it could be used publicly. Taylor confirmed that the U.S. presentation was unclassified, and asked whether Russia could provide an unclassified briefing. Koshelev responded that Russia approached the work of the BIC in the same manner as that of the JCIC, and that the information exchanged was confidential. The only treaty for which Russia provides information in a public forum is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Taylor assured Koshelev that the United States would continue to handle as confidential the information provided by Russia through the BIC.

¶11. (C) The only additional question raised came from Novikov, who asked when the deactivation of the AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile will be completed. Yaguchi explained that it will take several years to deactivate all missiles as there is a technical process that must be completed within a set of control procedures to ensure safety. When asked whether deactivation would be completed by the expiration of the Moscow Treaty on December 31, 2012, Yaguchi said he did not know, but would ask whether Washington could provide a more definitive answer. After querying Washington, Delegation was provided with the following response: "The United States plans to complete the deactivation of the AGM-129 by December 31, 2012." That response was provided to Novikov in the form of a Delegation paper.

¶12. (C) The U.S. delegation had no questions concerning the Russian presentation.

CONCLUSION

¶13. (C) Taylor expressed appreciation for the information

provided by the Russian Federation, and noted that Russia was within the limits set by the Moscow Treaty and the United States was well on its way. He concluded by stating that meetings of the BIC are useful and demonstrate the ability of the United States and Russia to work cooperatively within the strategic relationship they have developed, and that each side can take lessons from the examples set by the U.S. and Russian presidents in their ability to work together in a cooperative manner.

¶14. (C) Koshelev agreed, and noted that the working relationship between Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak and Under Secretary Rood, particularly within the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, provides another example of the ability of Russia and the United States to work constructively on issues of importance. This is true also within the BIC, which contributes to Moscow Treaty implementation. Regarding the next meeting, Koshelev suggested that Russia and the United States consider a regularization of the information exchanged, as this was important considering the upcoming expiration of the START Treaty. Deferring any specific proposals, Koshelev suggested that this issue simply be considered.

¶15. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Presentation, dated July 2008, (briefing only); and

-- U.S. Delegation paper "U.S. plans to deactivate the AGM-129," dated July 21, 2008.

- Russia:

-- Russian Presentation on Reductions of Strategic

Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation under the SOR
Treaty, dated July 2008.

¶16. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Ms. Bosco
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Couch
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Fortier
Maj Gondol
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Tessier
Mr. Vogel
Mr. Yaguchi
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

Russia

Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Belyayev
Mr. Kashirin
CAPT (1st Rank) Kuz'min
Mr. Lapshin
Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov

Mr. Serov
Ms. Sorokina
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int)

¶17. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR

NNNN

End Cable Text